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Future Extensions of Audit Services; 
Meeting Investors' Future Needs 
Donald J. Bevis 
Touche Ross & Co. 
In a changing world, the unchanging role of the CPA is to serve the investor. 
Selfishly, the CPA wants to be the prime—even the only—servant of the investor. 
Generously, the CPA wants to serve the investor all the information he may 
need. A little clear thought shows that "only" and "all" are too strong. Yet the 
CPA is and should remain in the forefront of the campaign to provide the 
investor with quality information. 
In our world of very rapid change, the nature of "investor information" is 
changing rapidly. For example, where plant capacity, production costs or sales 
volume were once the key factors, social values may now also be material. Al-
though our role does not change, the data we audit and the scope of the informa-
tion we examine and evaluate must change. 
The Conditions of Change and Growth 
For many centuries, tomorrow and yesterday were very much alike. There 
were few dramatic changes, and they were far between. Always, the frontier 
was a wilderness. There was very little difference, for example, between 1670— 
when the Hudson's Bay Company was formed by a group of venturers and 
adventurers—and 1770 when the colonies began to flex their muscle. In those 
times, yesterday's results were a strong predictor of tomorrow's performance. 
For the investor, the venturer, historical data were very significant. 
Today, the great lament is that change comes so fast. We are unable to 
keep up, to assimilate, to digest. We wonder what will come next from the 
research lab, from the ecologists, from Congress, from the ghetto, via the 
satellite, from the moon, or from 400 fathoms. Something is coming all the 
time. The effect is to compress time, and for the investor, to diminish the sig-
nificance of historical data. More useful data must be sought, in broader fields, 
and with a visionary eye. 
In the days of the Hudson's Bay Company, entrepreneurs banded together 
in joint ventures to capitalize on opportunities in strange, new, faraway places. 
When the venture was completed, the manager called a meeting to report to the 
venturers. Usually his report was oral, and the venturers had an opportunity to 
ask questions and interrogate the venture manager and the exploring team. 
By experience, the investors found that these review meetings were more suc-
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cessful if they brought along their own expert, an experienced businessman who 
had no vested interest in that particular venture, to listen to the manager's 
presentation and to challenge unreasonable assertions. The venturers were in-
terested in the results of the completed voyage, of course; they also needed an 
understanding of management's performance so that they could make reinvest-
ment decisions intelligently. 
From these early beginnings came the auditing profession of today. The 
objective and critical independence which made the auditor valuable to the in-
vesting public during the time of colonial exploration is of even more value 
today. Absentee owners still need an independent, objective, informed opinion 
about their investments. Today, the owner is more detached than ever from the 
activity in which he invests. The detachment of the investor, the complexity of 
business today, and the trend from laissez faire to consumerism have heightened 
the need for reliable decision making information—decision making information 
independently attested. 
As the investing public demanded better decision making information, the 
profession responded. We might argue about how successful the response has 
been, but there should be no argument that the need has been evident, the pro-
fession has recognized the need, and an effort has been made to meet that need. 
We now take it for granted that a publicly-held business will prepare 
an annual financial statement. It has not always been so, however. 
The investing public is demanding more timely information and it's 
clear that interim reporting is taking on additional importance. It's safe 
to predict that eventually quarterly financial statements will be as routine 
as the present annual report. 
Accounting Trends and Techniques now reports that all companies in 
its sample provide sales information. Many in the profession will remem-
ber that the issue of sales disclosure was so controversial that it was 
viewed as the final cut which if insisted upon would alienate the ac-
countants from the business community. Today, however, many com-
panies are experimenting with segmented reporting of sales and profit 
contributions. 
Today, we are grappling with quantifying complexities such as leases 
and option plans. These studies are also controversial, but the investor 
has made it clear that there must be a better way to communicate than 
by complex, obscure footnotes. 
Each new development in public reporting brought with it cries of anguish 
from those who could only see potential dangers. Public pressure, however, has 
overcome that resistance and with the help of the profession, the investor today 
has more reliable, more useful decision making information than ever before. 
But, considering the changing, complex world today, is the investor really 
informed? Does he have more information, relatively, than the venturer who 
invested in the Hudson's Bay Company? 
Public Forecasting Is the Next Step 
It has become increasingly clear that the investing public is dissatisfied with 
simple, historical data. The public is saying that they need more information 
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about the future prospects for a business. Based on past developments in financial 
reporting, it seems safe to predict that the investors will be given what they 
demand. 
It has long been acknowledged that the public investor tends to use the 
classic, historical financial statement as an indication of the company's future 
prospects. The market price of a stock is influenced by many factors, but even 
the most uninitiated investor recognizes that a major influence is a company's 
prospects for future earnings growth. Analysts use the historical financial state-
ments as the basis for their projections, adjusting prior years' performance for 
predicted variations in the economy and the industry. Individual investors follow 
trend lines and tend to make assumptions about the future based on the com-
pany's past performance. But in all too many cases investors find these history-
based trends to be inadequate and turn to rumor and speculation to make their 
decisions about the future. 
The investing public is hungry for profit—and therefore for information 
about a company's prospects. Whether we like it or not, decisions will be made 
based on forecast data. The decisions will be made whether the forecast data are 
reliable or not. 
The SEC had long taken the position that a company may not talk about 
its prospects for the future when it is in registration. However, the SEC is 
taking another look at that policy, and has stated that factual information should 
always be timely given. And in a recent speech, the Chairman of the SEC sug-
gested it might be appropriate to experiment with forecast information in a 
prospectus. The Commission has apparently concluded that the investor should 
have formalized, controlled forecast data rather than relying on street talk. 
In England, the City of London Code requires an accountant's report on 
any projection of operating results included in a takeover or merger proposal. 
John P. Grenside, writing in The Journal of Accountancy, said, "It is indeed 
difficult to see how shareholders can form a judgment as to the value of their 
shares or the merits of the [takeover] offer without this [profit forecast] informa-
tion, particularly when a significant change in a company's fortunes is expected."1 
In a speech before the Chicago Chapter of the Planning Executives Institute 
in January, 1972, Dean Sidney Davidson of the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business, predicted that within five years publicly held companies 
would be including forecast data with their regular annual reports. Dean David-
son said "It is not a question of if, it is simply a question when and in what form." 
The financial analysts have concluded that public companies must give the 
investing public more information about their prospects—and do it in a more 
structured way. At the Seaview Symposium in November of 1971, the analysts 
expressed their concern that a company avoid surprises in the market place. In 
that context, it was concluded, "Among the participants the analysts seemed 
generally in agreement that public forecasting was an idea whose time had come."2 
The trend seems abundantly clear. The investing public will demand in-
formation about the future potential of their investments and that demand will 
be met. It also seems clear that the profession must anticipate that demand and 
be prepared to meet the public need in the most productive way. 
Forecasting Defined 
Before we pursue this subject further, it will be helpful to define our terms. 
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Forecasting is a broad term, and it encompasses many different levels of predictive 
information—micro and macro, internal and external. Let us agree, for instance, 
that a feasibility study to determine whether to expand the plant or whether to 
buy a component from a supplier or manfacture it ourselves is one form of fore-
cast. Investment analysts estimate earnings per share information for many 
publicly traded companies, and this data too can be considered to be forecast data. 
Some consumer oriented companies publish actual and projected information 
about their industry. For our purposes, these industry projections still can be 
considered forecast data even though the investor must make his own assump-
tions about market share and product costs to convert this broad economic 
information into a measure of a company's operating prospects. Finally, most 
well managed companies prepare a profit plan to guide them in their current 
decisions. That profit plan is technically a budget, but for the purpose of this 
paper, we will consider it to be a part of the family of forecast data. 
Reporting Forecast Data to the Public 
What kind of forecast information should be made available to the investing 
public? Since we are on the threshold of a new accounting concept, perhaps we 
can take a new approach to the kinds of information to be made available. 
Perhaps we can avoid some of the problems we have had with traditional financial 
statements. Traditional historical statements have grown like Topsy; perhaps we 
can anticipate the need for forecasting information and shape its development 
rather than follow its evolution. 
It would be a mistake to insist on one format for forecast data from all 
companies. The kind of information provided should vary, depending on such 
circumstances as the quality of information available, the degree of certainty 
related to the assumptions, and the company's track record. 
The long-established, stable company, such as a public utility, might well 
present comparative earnings information: last year, this year and next year. 
Ideally, such an earnings statement should show last year's projections for the 
current year, this year's actual results, and next year's forecast. This presentation 
would be appropriate for most stable companies because their products are ac-
cepted, they can look to their own sales experience as well as reliable external 
information to forecast volume, and their management experience gives them a 
clearer understanding of their company's volume—cost relationship. 
At the other extreme, a new development company, formed to exploit an 
idea, should not try to provide that kind of comprehensive information. Instead, 
they should make available all reliable component information. What are product 
costs expected to be at various sales levels? What are the results of market re-
search studies? What factors might influence the company's sales success? For 
many companies in the development stage, it would be inappropriate to prepare 
a comprehensive earnings forecast because there are simply too many variables. 
Those variables do not excuse a company from publishing the information it 
has available, however. The investor must recognize that his investment in a 
development stage company carries greater risks than his investment in the 
long-time, stable company. The investor will assemble his own forecast for the 
development company—he is doing so today, but he must be given all of the 
reliable information that is available. 
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In between these two extremes, the stable company and the development 
company, different kinds of presentation will be required. For most companies, 
the single, most important variable in their forecast is product sales. It may be 
appropriate to present several earnings projections based on different sales as-
sumptions, making appropriate cost adjustments because of the different volume 
projections. The text of the forecast should describe the sales assumptions and 
relate them to the company's prior experience and to that predictive information 
which is available about the industry or the economy as a whole. 
In any situation, the assumptions underlying the forecast data must be 
clearly spelled out. Al l significant assumptions should be disclosed; "significant" 
in this context should be related to the significance of the assumptions to the 
reader's understanding of the forecast data and the degree of certainty or risk 
associated with the forecast. 
Auditing a Published Forecast 
It seems apparent that the public investor will demand and will be given 
forecasting information. It also seems apparent that the public will insist on some 
form of attestation on the forecast data. The outside stockholder has felt the 
need of an objective, independent comment on the representations of manage-
ment as expressed in historical financial statements. It seems reasonable to expect 
that management representations about forecast data will become critical to 
investment decisions, and as they increase in importance, independent attestation 
will be required. 
Ijiri says ". . . usefulness of budget disclosure to stockholders and other 
investors is unquestionable. Implementation of budget disclosure must be 
supported by effective budget auditing in order to insure the reliability of the 
budgets."3 
Nurnberg agrees, "It seems apparent that budgets will be published even-
tually . . . and once budgets are published, auditors will be called upon to attest 
to them. The attest function will be extended to budgets as the need for attesta-
tion is demonstrated."4 
Our English counterparts experienced this evolving demand. Originally, 
the City Code required that in any proposed merger or takeover, the directors 
were to prepare forecast information and the accountants were to act as advisors 
and consultants to see that the forecast data was prepared with due care. The 
accountants agreed to report on their study of the forecast data and to make 
their reports available to the City Panel but not to the public stockholders. This 
proved to be an untenable situation: 
The public knew that the accountants had issued a report on the fore-
cast and they were exerting pressure to have that information made 
available. 
Company management took the position that they had paid substantial 
sums to have the auditors participate and they ought to be able to make 
the auditors' report public information. 
If an auditor had some reservation about forecast material prepared by 
a company, he found it very difficult to make his reservations known 
when he was precluded from publishing his report. 
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Mr. Grenside reports, "There were thus obvious and increasing difficulties 
in the application in practice of the Institute's advice that reporting accountants 
should not permit their names to be directly associated with profit forecasts 
and there was pressure for the accountancy bodies to reconsider their position."5 
After much soul searching and negotiation, the accountants and the City au-
thorities agreed that the accountant's report, covering the accounting basis and 
calculations for the forecast, would be published and the accountant would 
formally consent to (or deny) the use of his report in the merger documents. 
The public accounting profession is in a unique position to meet the need 
for audited forecast information. In the area of historical financial reporting, the 
profession has established a reputation for independence and objectivity. The in-
vesting community also accepts as fact that the CPA is a prudent business 
man, an expert in the field of accountancy and reporting and that he has 
thorough understanding of his client's business. These qualities—and the public 
recognition and acceptance of them—are necessary for effective attestation of his-
torical and forecast financial data. 
Standards of Performance—Auditing Forecast Data 
If we accept the fact that the public accounting profession will be a part 
of this new accounting concept—published forecast data—it will be important 
to develop a framework for his participation. As a starting point, let us para-
phrase the ten generally accepted auditing standards and consider how they ap-
ply to the auditing of forecast data. For some of the standards, their application 
will be self-evident and no further comment will be required; for some others we 
must expand our traditional understanding for this new application. 
The General Standards 
The examination is to be performed by experienced CPAs who have 
training in the unique skills required for forecasting. The CPAs will 
conduct their examination with independence and due professional care. 
Clearly the spirit of the General Standards applies to the examination of 
forecast data. The examination should be performed by a proficient CPA: one 
who is trained to gather and evaluate evidential matter; one who is trained to 
evaluate the fairness of presentation; one who is experienced in challenging the 
representations of management. 
It is true, of course, that there are a number of unique skills involved in the 
preparation of a forecast. Companies who do internal forecasting today may use 
the skills of a market researcher, an economist, and an expert in cost behavior 
analysis. The CPA must be expected to be familiar with these unique skills in 
order to evaluate management's forecasting, but it's not necessary that he be a 
specialist in all of these fields. He must understand them so that he can be alert 
to possible misapplication or misuse of the procedures, but he need not have the 
same level of expertise as the specialist in the field any more than he need be a 
specialist in cost accounting, credit and collection, or electronic data processing 
in order to perform his traditional examination of historical financial statements. 
It is understood that the CPA must proceed with an independent mental 
attitude. We're not talking about the independence rule which forbids him from 
60 
owning stock in his client, although the appearance of independence is certainly 
crucial to the public acceptance of any attestation. When we're talking about 
auditing a forecast, however, we're looking for the kind of independence that 
is demonstrated when a CPA: 
Issues a qualified opinion on historical statements even though he knows 
he is inviting criticism of his prior years' unqualified opinions: 
Insists on a certain accounting treatment because he is convinced it is 
right, even though there may be precedent for an alternative; 
Faces up to a mistake and insists on withdrawal and correction of a 
report which he previously certified; 
Proceeds on the basis that his client is the investing public. 
The Standards of Field Work 
The CPA will review the procedures used by management in preparing 
the forecast data and will gather and evaluate such competent evidential 
matter as is necessary for him to formulate an opinion as to the reason-
ableness of the underlying assumptions and the forecast presentation. 
If we're going to be involved in forecast reporting, we must go beyond the 
compilation stage. If we're to be associated with a forecast, we must be satisfied 
that the assumptions used in preparing the forecast are reasonable. Again, the 
experience of our English friends as reported by Grenside will be helpful: 
. . . the accountants' report is to be published, but it is to be confined 
to the "accounting bases and calculations for the forecast." 
The accountants are, however, required to give their consent to the 
publication of their report. This, in my opinion, imposes on the ac-
countants an obligation to satisfy themselves as to the general reason-
ableness of the forecast itself and the assumptions on which it is based. 
If they are unable to do this, the accountants should qualify their report 
or, as an ultimate resort, withhold their consent to publish.6 
In attesting to the reasonableness of the assumptions used in the forecast, 
the CPA will also have to be satisfied that a thorough job has been done. He 
will have to be satisfied that management has taken all steps that could reasonably 
be expected to search out those factors which might influence the forecast. 
If a CPA is to form an opinion on the reasonableness of the underlying as-
sumptions and the forecast presentation, he must have evidence in support of 
his opinion. It is not possible to anticipate what form the evidence might take 
because the circumstances in each situation will vary. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that the CPA will want to consider: 
published statistics from trade associations 
government information about a market segment 
specific market research studies by the company or outside consultants 
volume—cost studies prepared by the company's accounting unit. 
In some cases, it may be necessary for the CPA to retain an outside con-
sultant to assist him in his evaluations of the evidence. 
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As companies develop experience in public forecasting, good procedures 
will be codified. When a company is able to proceduralize its forecasting proc-
ess, the auditor will be able to review the procedures and will report on their 
reasonableness and their consistent application. It is doubtful whether a new 
company (or one new to forecasting) will have developed a satisfactory set of 
forecasting procedures, and this stage of development will naturally affect the 
CPA's level of satisfaction. The public investor will expect audit comments on 
forecasting procedures, and it is reasonable to assume that he will expect im-
provement from management. 
The Standards of Reporting 
The objective of the CPA's report is to assure the reader that the forecast 
information is the best available under the circumstances and that it is 
presented without bias, but the CPA must disclaim any opinion as to 
the outcome of the forecast. 
In the same way that the presentation of the forecast information should 
vary depending on the circumstances, the attest report on forecast data must not 
be confined to a standard format. Today, audit reports on historical statements 
are either unqualified, qualified, or adverse. The traditional, historical financial 
statement can not be understood in "yes or no" terms, and the profession should 
never have allowed itself to fall into the trap of issuing a boilerplate, "yes or no" 
report. Forecast data is even more complex than traditional financial statements, 
and the attest report on forecast data must be written in such a way that the 
reader will read the report, evaluate all of the CPA's comments, and understand 
what he is trying to say. For instance, the CPA must be able to say, if necessary, 
that there is insufficient data available to form an opinion, without leaving an 
implication that management has been derelict in its duty. There will be many 
straight-forward, clearly legitimate situations where there will be inadequate 
data. The investing public must be able to understand the report, understand 
the nature of the risk, and act accordingly. 
Each report on a forecast engagement must be a special report, written for 
the unique engagement. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the key elements 
required in any such report: 
Identification of the data covered by the report 
Statement of the purpose of the forecast 
Reference to the underlying assumptions and an opinion on their rea-
sonableness. (If certain assumptions are not evaluable, a statement to 
that effect) 
A disclaimer as to responsibility for the ultimate attainment of the pro-
jected results 
For example, a forecast report on a real estate tax shelter program might take the 
following form: 
The accompanying forecast financial statements of XYZ Properties (a 
limited partnership) for the years 1970 through 1990, shown on pages 
2 through 6, were prepared to provide estimates of cash inflow from 
62 
partners' investments, net cash flow returned to partners, and tax 
consequences of projected operations to individual partners in selected 
income tax brackets. The forecast statements have been prepared using 
the assumptions and rationale set forth on pages 7 through 11. 
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationale underlying the fore-
cast financial statements. We believe these assumptions and rationale 
are reasonable and appropriate for the purpose of this forecast. 
Since forecasts are based on assumptions about circumstances and events 
that have not yet taken place, they are subject to the variations that 
may arise as future operations actually occur. Accordingly, we cannot 
give assurance that the predicted results will actually be attained. 
If the CPA has not been able to find support for the key assumptions underlying 
the forecast report he might use the following words: 
The accompanying statement of projected operations of the ABC Com-
pany (proposed to be formed) for the year ending June 30, 1972 was 
prepared on the basis of the assumptions and rationale as set forth on 
pages 3 through 8, to estimate what net income might be if the com-
pany were to produce a certain new line of children's toys. 
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationable underlying the state-
ment of projected operations. Since there is no similar line of toys 
presently on the market and no marketing research has been conducted, 
we are unable to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumptions relating 
to unit volume and selling prices. All other assumptions appear reason-
able and appropriate for the purpose of this projection, but since their 
application to the statement of projected operations is, in most cases, 
directly related to unit volume, the reliability of their application depends 
on the accuracy of the unit volume assumption. 
These projections are based on assumptions about future circumstances 
and events. We do not know the future and we cannot give assurance 
that the projected results will actually be attained. 
It should be understood that the CPA would insist on disclosure of material con-
flicting evidence, or if he should conclude that the forecast data is misleading, 
he would withdraw from the engagement. 
Forward Work 
The issue is not whether forecast material will be provided to the users of 
financial statements, but what form will the forecast report take. The question 
is not whether CPAs will be asked to comment on the forecast data, but what 
must be done to be able to comment intelligently. There is a great deal of re-
search to be done, and judging by the momentum behind the idea, there may 
not be much time. There are three specific areas which should be explored care-
fully in practice and in the literature: 
We must understand how the public will use forecast data when it is 
provided to them in an organized way. 
We must develop the principles to be followed in presenting forecast data. 
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We must study the question of a common body of knowledge for those 
who will work in forecasting, and bring the profession up to speed. 
But What About— 
There are those who say that the legal liability aspects of reporting on fore-
cast data are so great that we can't afford to be involved. There are those who 
say that the investor will lose confidence in the auditor's attestation on historical 
statements when some of the forecast data we attest to prove to be only a rea-
sonable man's best efforts. However, George O. May put it very well when he 
said, "Preoccupation with the importance of not misleading investors has ob-
scured the desirability of enlightening them."7 
Numbers Aren't Enough—How about Management's Performance 
A CPA engaged for an examination of public forecast data finds himself in 
familiar territory—he will be evaluating and reporting on financial data. It has 
been suggested, however, than an analysis of data, historical or prospective, is a 
superficial way to comprehend an enterprise. It has been suggested that the 
only way to understand a company's prospects for the future is to understand 
management's ability to manage. 
Within the profession there is considerable interest and debate about whether 
or not the CPA can appropriately give an evaluation of management. The major 
objections seem to be: 
there are no standards for measurement of management performance. 
people (management) change, conceivably rapidly, and they all have 
their "good" periods and "bad" periods. 
It seems fair, however, to point out that it took a while to develop a base of 
generally accepted auditing standards, and certainly there is more to be done in 
the basic audit area where we feel so comfortable. You will recall that CPAs 
were attesting to financial statements before today's auditing standards were 
articulated. If the profession were not continually evolving, we would not be 
discussing in this symposium "Where do we go from here?" 
The Hudson's Bay venturers never went exploring but they had first hand 
contact with their agents who did. At the completion of a voyage they had the 
opportunity to sign up for the next trip or look elsewhere for investment po-
tential. They made their decision based on their experience and on their first-
hand appraisal of management's skills. Today, can the investor make an intelli-
gent appraisal of management skills? He can do so only on the basis of the 
company's historical performance. Tomorrow we may be able to evaluate man-
agement's ability based on their performance against a forecast. Doesn't the 
investor need—can't he be given—a more direct appraisal? 
What Is a Management Evaluation? 
Semantics give us a problem. If we are evaluating management, we are 
probably talking about people. If we are evaluating management systems, we are 
covering both people and their adopted systems in a given area. If we are 
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evaluating management performance, we must consider how the people per-
formed against their systems, which also must be evaluated in terms of external 
standards. 
We should not attempt to evaluate management except in the broadest 
terms—management performance. While doing less may seem to be a conserva-
tive extension of the attest function, there is a probability that stopping short is 
a most dangerous posture. Partial consideration of a given subject by the CPA, 
a professional expected (in the information user's subjective view) to assure full 
disclosure, will leave an implication that what is not said is satisfactory. 
Where to Begin 
Let us examine our recent efforts on reporting on internal control (State-
ment on Auditing Procedure No. 49). This pronouncement resulted because 
CPAs were already attesting to the adequacy of internal controls. The degrees 
varied, of course, from simple specification of weaknesses, to negative assurance, 
to a positive opinion on adequacy. The AICPA Committee on Auditing Pro-
cedure had planned to develop an SAP on the substance of internal control and 
the related auditor's approach, but contemporary pressures required attention to 
the visible problem of reporting. The result: a long, but informative, report 
cautioning the reader about the difficulties of measurement and concluding with 
what amounts to a form of negative assurance. The reception to SAP 49 has not 
been uniformly laudatory, particularly by government agencies, some of which 
suggest that it is a cutback in auditing as well as in responsibility assumed by 
the CPA. Change may be required in SAP 49, but when is change not required 
on the path of progress? 
The formal entry into reporting on internal control is but a few steps removed 
from evaluations of management performance. If we admit that the system of 
internal accounting controls can be evaluated, then we will have to agree that 
administrative controls are similarly situated, given standards and a competent 
examiner. If we can address ourselves to the entire system of internal control, 
accounting and administrative, we should be able to evaluate the system as well 
as management's performance within it. 
The Critical Factors 
The issues of standards of evaluation and the competence of the evaluator 
are critical, of course. John L. Carey, in The CPA Plans for the Future, lists a 
number of possible quantitative criteria; perhaps those in which public interest 
was high at the time. Surely the list can be adjusted if the profession is willing 
to invest in the effort needed to articulate preliminary performance standards, 
both social and profit oriented. And there should be no misconception that there 
can ever be a standard for every situation. We do not have this now. A good 
example is the debate over whether non-arm's length transactions require no 
disclosure, full disclosure, or full disclosure with evaluation of the terms of the 
transactions—yet we continue attesting to historical financial statements none-
theless. 
If we tell our attest users what we are attesting to in the area of management 
performance, the users will let us know what changes they want made. And the 
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standards will evolve in any event, through continuous consideration by the 
profession. 
What about the CPA's competence? The major assets of the CPA are his 
independence, his objectivity and a thorough knowledge of his client. Even if 
specially engaged to evaluate management performance, the CPA has the knowl-
edge of how to go about investigating the whole of the business, because of his 
usual audit approach. The use of experts from other disciplines is already com-
mon in financial auditing, particularly when major uncertainties seem to exist. 
There is every reason to believe this use can expand to accommodate the new 
criteria needing evaluation. The auditing profession will be far better off attest-
ing to management performance under its own guidelines than being required 
to consider, as in historical financial auditing, performance criteria which will 
surely be created outside the profession. 
Professors Langenderfer and Robertson believe it is feasible to perform 
independent management auditing.8 Their hypotheses are considered in parallel 
to financial auditing postulates,9 and they believe that the same philosophy covers 
both financial and management auditing. Their position would make a good 
starting point for serious consideration of the CPA's role in this area. 
Conclusion 
Historical financial information has value to an investor—to a limited 
degree because it is history, but more so because it has been an indicator of the 
future. Because of the rapid rate of change, the value of historical data as an 
indicator of the future has diminished. The investor needs and will somehow 
find other indicators of future performance. It is our responsibility to see that 
the investor has the best possible information. If we are to meet our time 
honored responsibilities in the future we must move beyond traditional practice 
and into the frontiers of forecasting and management evaluation. Like the 
voyagers of old, we must take the risk so that we may thereby best serve the 
needs of the public. 
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